All this talk about how borrowing costs are so low that Washington couldn’t possibly be facing any sort of a debt crisis – that the 3.2 percent yield on the ten-year note is somehow a vote of confidence in policies coming out of the nation’s capitol – makes me think that, just as the insane fixation on a low consumer price index was a major contributor to the financial crisis, signals coming from U.S. debt markets are being similarly misinterpreted today and this may ultimately lead to an even bigger crisis in our not-too-distant future.

Misreading what these indicators are saying – or simply reading into them  what one wants to believe instead – has led to bad policymaking before and is likely to do so again.

Perhaps sooner than anyone might think…

For a good example of this, one has only to look back to the middle of the last decade when the housing market was booming and economists across the land marveled at how the Federal Reserve had not only tamed the business cycle and kept prices low, but made nearly every homeowner wealthy to boot!

The central bank’s fixation on the green light being emitted by the consumer price index (and then, unbelievably, fear of deflation in 2002-2003 as home prices were rising at 10 or 15 percent a year) blinded policymakers to the flashing red light of an asset bubble that would meet its pin a few years later.

Similarly, the eagerness demonstrated by many elected officials in Washington to keep making that national debt clock spin faster and higher (with the blessing of most economists) while marveling at how little it costs to keep paying interest on the $13+ trillion tab could be setting the stage for a vicious cycle of sharply higher borrowing costs and even higher deficits.

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Recent developments in the euro zone that increasingly look like they will lead to the restructuring (if not the collapse) of one of the world’s major currencies and the potential for this “contagion” to move first north to the U.K. and then west to the U.S. have many people wondering what’s gone wrong with the global monetary system.

How could advanced Western economies have run into such trouble?

With trillions of dollars in debt now transferred from private sector balance sheets onto those of governments (where very different rules apply), could the problems seen in mainland Europe today spread to the British Isles and then to the U.S. where fiscal and economic conditions are, arguably, even worse?

Despite all the talk about slashing budgets in the former and upward revisions to economic growth forecasts in the latter, it seems clear that these two Anglo Saxon nations are not yet clear of danger and, if that danger comes, we may see something that rhymes not-so-nicely with the events of late-2008 as history is not prone to repeating exactly.

How did it come to this point of staring into the abyss and, perhaps, falling in?

In a word, the problem is “debt”.

Too much of it.

There are those who say that, like many things in life, a little debt is a good thing and this is very true.

Credit markets connect investors and entrepreneurs, both of whom presumably understand the risk that is involved, and when a good idea gets a little money behind it, wonderful things can happen – economic growth, job creation, and rising standards of living to name just a few.

And borrowing by governments is not necessarily a bad thing.

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One look at yet one more story about how the world should assess and assign blame for the ongoing financial crisis, this one appearing over at the Wall Street Journal Real Time Economics Blog the other day titled No Resolution in Sight in Fed Blame Game, has belatedly brought me to the conclusion that, for years now, nearly everybody has been asking the wrong question about blame for the financial crisis.

Of course there was no one person or one group that was primarily responsible for the financial crisis - clearly it took many players to cause a mess as big as the one that we now have on our hands.

Yet, that’s the question that everyone seems to want answered in recent years.

Who caused it?

Which individuals, what organizations?

If ever there were a good example of a group effort, the housing and credit market bubbles and their inevitable demise were surely it and seeking to find the one group that was most responsible is really an exercise in futility because no one fits that bill.

Ultimately, it’s not a very productive exercise either, save for the astonishingly consistent repetition by the nation’s central bank that low interest rates were not to blame. That, by itself, speaks volumes about where we are in the process of understanding what has happened since 2008 and fixing it.

Maybe a better question to ask is, who could have prevented it or stopped it?

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Just when you think that the statistics can’t get any worse for the graduating class of the Obama Administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program, they do. Otherwise known as HAMP, this program is apparently designed to convince people who really can’t afford their current debt load that they really can.

To that end, it is meeting with modest success.

How else can one explain that total debt-to-income ratios have risen even higher than February’s ridiculous burden of just under 60 percent as noted in this item four weeks ago?

Over the last four weeks, some 60,000 HAMP “trial” participants have had their loan modifications elevated to “permanent” status, meaning that they can now go confidently forth into the world thinking that their impossible debt load is somehow under control.

It’s not.

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Not being much of a conspiracy theorist, last week’s hearing by the CFTC (Commodities Futures Trading Commission) on futures market trading for metals was a subject of some interest to me, but the news flow since that time has been rather remarkable – if for no other reason that none of the news seems to be flowing in the mainstream media.

In fact, a search at the Wall Street Journal on “Gensler” (CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler would surely be included in any report) produces only this one item from before the hearing.

You’d think that, if a news organization that normally finds time to report on the most arcane of financial market goings-on saw fit to publish a story before the hearing was held, they’d also figure it was worthwhile to let their readers know what happened at the hearing.

Apparently not.

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One of the things that many people go through their entire lives without ever realizing is that conditions haven’t always been the way they remember them to be. Due to the length of a typical lifetime and the number of those years that individuals are productive, it’s reasonable to think that someone in their mid-60s could retire today and look back at the last 40 years only to conclude that what they just experienced was normal.

But, what if the last 40 years were anything but normal?

What if, in the world of finance and economics, it was all just a big bubble?

One look at the chart below from this recent Wall Street Journal story and it becomes instantly clear that stock market valuations over the last twenty years have been nowhere near normal. In fact, what were deemed “generational lows” for valuations at the peak of the financial market crisis a year ago look like nothing of the sort over the broad sweep of time.

And when you consider what happened in the natural resource sector in the 1970s and then what followed in Japan in the 1980s, it’s quite easy to come to the conclusion that, since the world left those last vestiges of sound money when Nixon closed the gold window in 1971, we live in a radically different world.

While some quickly dismiss ideas like this, reminding anyone who will listen that “correlation is not causation” while citing technological advances made during this time as just cause for the changes we’ve seen in financial markets, breakthroughs such as railroads and electricity a hundred or more years ago likely had a bigger impact on the world than computers, communication, and medical technology more recently.

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