REMINDER: All investment, economics, and finance related material now appears at the new IaconoResearch.com. For the time being at least, this has become a personal blog covering a variety of mostly unrelated topics.

Quantitative Easing Revisited

This follow-up to the wildly popular original YouTube hit Quantitative Easing Explained covers such subjects as how quality improvements in the iPad 2 keep inflation low and how Fed money printing rewards the wealthy while punishing the poor.

Though its popularity pales in comparison to its predecessor (about 5 thousand views vs. 5 million views), it’s still worth a look if for no other reason than this quip:

I have figured out the formula for predicting the Fed’s actions. First, you take a past policy that has been a complete bust. Then you double the size and do it twice as long.







Marc Faber – U.S. Housing Bull

Count Gloom, Boom & Doomer Marc Faber as one more in a rapidly expanding group of housing bulls, the long-time market analyst commenting in this CNBC story today that there is value in the southern states where property prices continue to fall.

“If you look at the supply of homes, new construction, and compare it to immigration into the United States, to the growth of the population, then these (southern) markets are very attractive from a longer term perspective,” Faber told Bernie Lo on CNBC’s Straight Talk.

Among the markets he pointed to were Atlanta, Phoenix and Miami. Faber said investors could earn a rental yield of 8 percent per year and buy homes in the south of the U.S. at a 40 to 50 percent discount to construction costs.

Faber said he went to see homes in Phoenix and Atlanta, and in some cases, U.S. homes were cheaper than those in Thailand, where he lives.

At the same time, the fact that people couldn’t get credit to buy homes in the U.S. was helping to boost the rental market, he added.

It is rather remarkable what is happening in a place like Atlanta. According to the latest Case-Shiller home price data, they’ve recently overtaken Cleveland and Phoenix while rapidly closing in on Las Vegas in what is, for some cities, an ongoing race to the bottom. Detroit remains the unquestioned leader in the group, however, extrapolating recent trends would see Atlanta claim that title by the end of the year.

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When Models Trump Common Sense

More evidence that U.S. economists are particularly ill-suited to run the U.S. economy comes via the fascinating exchange in recent days between St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard and a small army of bloggers with PhDs in economics, nearly all of the latter ganging up on Bullard after he suggested that the “output gap” theory for what ails the U.S. economy may be fundamentally flawed and that attempts to boost overall demand to close that gap through freakishly low interest rates and other super accommodative Federal Reserve policies might end up doing more harm than good.

Bullard threw a cat amongst the pigeons in this speech(.pdf) when he noted the following:

The recent recession has given rise to the idea that there is a very large “output gap” in the U.S. The story is that this large output gap is “keeping inflation at bay” and is fodder for keeping nominal interest rates near zero into an indefinite future. If we continue using this interpretation of events, it may be very difficult for the U.S. to ever move off of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This could be a looming disaster for the United States. I want to now turn to argue that the large output gap view may be conceptually inappropriate in the current situation. We may do better to replace it with the notion of a permanent, one-time shock to wealth.

Recall that I’ve railed on this subject a number of occasions over the years, the last time being this offering from about six months ago when it was noted:

The theory posits that it is not important what level of overall demand an economy has reached or how it got there, but that, when all the wheels fall off the wagon as they did back in 2008, the imperative is for the government to somehow restore that level of demand. Otherwise, you get another Great Depression.

It makes no difference if, back in 2005, people making $40,000 a year were buying no money down $500,000 homes and then, after the home’s value went up to $600,000 in 2006, pulling out their $100,000 in brand new home equity to put in a pool, buy a motor home, and install big screen TVs in every room of the house because, once you reach a certain level of demand and it begins to drop like a rock because everyone has become indebted up to their eyeballs, it must be restored.

At that point, it simply becomes a question of how much taxes must be cut or how much money must be borrowed or printed to accomplish that goal.

Of course, I don’t have any models to back up the contention that an unusually large portion of economic output we saw in the middle of the last decade was “artificial” due to the housing bubble, but economists do have models, and that’s the crux of the problem.

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Paper Money, Economists, and Hubris

I don’t recall how this WSJ op-ed came to my attention again the other day, but, since it did, it seemed worth sharing the paragraphs below. Originally appearing on August 15th last year – on the 40-year anniversary of Nixon closing the gold window – it reminds us of what a swell job economists continue to do for us non-economists in the world.

Most of today’s macroeconomists see surprisingly little wrong with the present system of fully elastic money. This is surprising for two reasons: First, there is the universally dismal historical record of paper money systems. Second, paper money systems are inherently incompatible with capitalism. In a state paper money system, the banking system is de-facto cartelized and the banks’ funding conditions and certain interest rates are determined administratively by a state agency—the central bank. The constant expansion of bank reserves constitutes an ongoing subsidy to the banks, which encourages further money creation through fractional-reserve banking. Credit growth in such an economy is no longer driven by the extent of saving in the economy but the result of central bank policy and the banks’ willingness to expand their balance sheets.

The belief among mainstream economists and central bankers today is obviously that they fully understand and can correctly anticipate the consequences of their monetary manipulations. The effects of money injections appear to them to be simply stronger growth and higher inflation, both neatly captured by the set of macro-statistics that modern economists follow so slavishly. All that central banks have to do, then, is target the right balance between the two. A display of such intellectual hubris was given by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke when he explained the Fed’s policy of quantitative easing to the U.S. public in an op-ed last November. Extolling the advantages of artificially depressed interest rates and propped up asset prices courtesy of the Fed, Bernanke promised that, “lower mortgage rates will make housing more affordable and allow more homeowners to refinance. Lower corporate bond rates will encourage investment. And higher stock prices will boost consumer wealth and help increase confidence, which can also spur spending. Increased spending will lead to higher incomes and profits that, in a virtuous circle, will further support economic expansion.”

This brings to mind the ongoing brouhaha between econo-bloggers and St. Louis Fed President James Bullard who, over the last week, has been taken to task for saying a lot of things that most non-economists would view as simple common sense, for example, that the housing bubble created a lot of artificial demand in the economy in the last decade and attempting to restore aggregate demand to that level through money printing is dangerous.

Moody’s Downgrades Italy, Spain, Warns U.K.

Just when you thought it was safe to buy stocks again – after the Greek austerity deal was approved over the weekend amid rioting in the streets of Athens – another credit rating agency seems intent on spoiling all the fun. Following a similar move by Standard & Poor’s last month, Moody’s cut credit ratings for Italy, Spain, Portugal and three other smaller European nations and said they may strip the U.K. and France of their triple-A rating.

It seems that European policy makers are not moving fast enough for the credit rating agency, Moody’s chief credit officer Alistair Wilson noting, “We do not think they have done enough to reassure the market that we are on a stable path. What will guide long-term ratings is the clarity and the performance of policy makers and the macro picture”.

A New Perspective on the Fed’s Balance Sheet

Following the long-term look at the federal government’s public debt in this item from a short time ago comes this long-term view of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet compliments of the recently stumbled upon Gresham’s Law blog.

Note that the graphic is interactive in its original form at Gresham’s Law and additional charts are provided that go into great detail regarding what the central bank was doing, money-printing-wise, over 10 year periods beginning in 1915. But, the most important point is made in the right-most portion of the graphic above where even a log-scale chart would indicate an astounding increase in Fed largess.

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